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Abstract
For nearly 20 years, the Supreme Court’s federal-question jurisprudence
was muddied after the Court’s decision in Merrell-Dow. Last term, the
Court issued a much-needed clarification in Grable. But that clarification
needs clarification. In this Article, Professor Ryan endeavors to provide a
candid synthesis of what the law is after Grable. While this area is rich
with debate about what the law should be, a candid post-Grable synthesis
is needed both to guide courts and to provide a common ground for these
debates. Even such a modest task, however, is formidable. Federalquestion jurisdiction is not a concept that can be viewed without its
historical and theoretical underpinnings. And a bald reading of Grable
does not reveal the nuances that exist, as many years of precedent have
been synthesized into a new test. Professor Ryan traces the evolution of
the meaning of the words “arising under” in the federal-question statute
up to and through Grable and analyzes the new test in light of history,
evolution, and policy
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I. Introduction.
Federal-question jurisdiction has always been an elusive concept at its boundaries.
The amorphous, jurisdiction-granting words of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 are: “The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.”2 The key words, “arising under,” have proven to be two of
the more versatile words in the English language. They mean different things in different
contexts. And over time, they have evolved to mean very different things even in the
same contexts. Last term, in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering
2
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& Manufacturing,3 the Supreme Court issued the latest edition of its “arising under”
dictionary. This Article is a guide to that edition. I will attempt to provide a framework
for answering the is-there-federal-question-jurisdiction question. While there is much to
debate regarding what the law in this area should be, this Article avoids that question, and
instead endeavors to synthesize what the law is after Grable.
Having clarified the Article’s purpose, I must offer some preliminary warnings.
Federal-question jurisdiction cannot be understood without its theoretical and historical
contexts. While many cases present easily identifiable federal questions, the boundaries
of federal-question jurisdiction “require sensitive judgments about congressional intent,
judicial power, and the federal system.”4 And while the new edition modifies the
definition of “arising under,” the cases decided under earlier editions retain much
significance, and understanding them is crucial to understanding Grable’s new fourprong edition. Accordingly, I will trace the evolution of the doctrine and policy, which
ultimately must shape the interpretation of the Grable edition. I will explore, in depth,
the four-prong test, synthesizing the earlier case law and highlighting ambiguities and
potential problems within the new test. Ultimately, I will conclude that the Grable
edition admirably answers more questions than it creates.
This Article proceeds in four additional parts. In Part II, I will outline the basic
structure of the subject-matter-jurisdiction inquiry.5 There, I will explain the structure of
Article III of the Constitution, the significance of its use of the words “arising under,”
and the interrelationship between those words in the Constitution and the same words in §
1331.

In Part III, I will trace the pre-Grable interpretation of the federal-question statute
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to provide the necessary context for understanding Grable at more than a superficial
level.6 In Part IV, I will detail the Grable decision and how it both arrived at and applied
its new four-prong test.7 Finally, in Part V, I will analyze the four-prong test and provide
a framework for applying it after Grable.8
II. The basic structure: how Article III and § 1331 interrelate.
Article III, § 2 provides that the judicial power “shall extend” to certain categories
of cases or controversies, known as the heads of jurisdiction.9 Despite the “shall extend”
language, Article III is not a self-executing grant of jurisdiction to the lower federal
courts.10 That is, Article III confers no jurisdiction on the federal district courts.11 To
have subject-matter jurisdiction, the federal district courts need congressional
authorization.12 What purpose, then, do the heads of jurisdiction serve in Article III, § 2?
The heads of jurisdiction define the limits on Congress’s power to confer jurisdiction on
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the federal courts.13 In other words, Article III, § 2 defines the maximum reach of the
federal judicial power—it sets the limits on what jurisdiction Congress can give its
courts.14 When Congress confers jurisdiction on the federal courts, it must be able to
point to one of the heads of jurisdiction as authorizing that particular grant. Thus,
determining subject-matter jurisdiction is a two-step process. First, did Congress confer
jurisdiction? And second, if so, did Article III, § 2 give Congress the power to confer
that jurisdiction?
Rarely will jurisdictional fights involve the second step. Modern federal-question
litigation almost always concerns the scope of the congressional authorization, § 1331.
This Article also focuses on the meaning of the congressional authorization. But
because § 1331 and Article III, § 2 use the same “arising under” phrase, distinguishing
the two steps is needed, if for no other reason than to prevent confusion.
Article III, § 2 gives Congress broad power to confer jurisdiction in cases “arising
under” the Constitution and laws of the United States.15 The Constitution allows
Congress to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts when a federal issue is merely a
potential ingredient of the case—even if the federal issue is not likely to be disputed.16
Osborn v. Bank of the United States illustrates the breadth of congressional power.17 In
Osborn, Congress had authorized federal jurisdiction over all suits by or against the Bank
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of the United States.18 The Court held that Congress had the authority, under the “arising
under” head of jurisdiction, to confer federal jurisdiction even in a garden-variety breachof-contract suit against the Bank, because federal law created the Bank and its right to
contract, and because a question about that authority could potentially be raised in any
suit against the Bank.19 While the Supreme Court has never defined the precise
boundaries of this power, 20 Osborn and its progeny demonstrate an impressive breadth.
The federal-question statute uses the same “arising under” phrase, but the statute
requires far more than federal law being merely a potential ingredient in the case.21
Although much of the legislative history suggests that Congress may have intended to
confer all its power when it passed § 1331 and thus extend jurisdiction to every case in
which federal law forms a potential ingredient, 22 the Court has construed the language
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much more narrowly.23 The next Part explores the evolving meaning of the phrase
“arising under” in § 1331.

III. Section 1331 and “arising under” before Grable.
Grable clarified (or perhaps more accurately, modified) the test for when a case
“arises under” federal law under § 1331. But Grable’s test cannot be fully understood
without appreciating what came before. Many of the pre-Grable cases remain important
because they have been synthesized into the Grable test or address jurisdictional issues
unchanged by Grable. Others are simply required to understand some of Grable’s
language and rationale.
This section proceeds in two parts. First, I will briefly outline the starting place
for all § 1331 inquiries: the well-pleaded-complaint rule. The well-pleaded-complaint
rule tells the court where to look to determine if a case arises under federal law. Grable
does not directly impact this rule. And second, I will outline the underlying question that
Grable addressed—what is the court looking for in the well-pleaded complaint? In other
words, what kinds of federal issues in a well-pleaded complaint make the case one that
arises under federal law?
A. Where to look: the well-pleaded-complaint rule.
The well-pleaded-complaint rule is a where-to-look rule. Under § 1331, a case
does not “arise under” federal law unless the “plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of
action shows that it is based upon” the Constitution or laws of the United States.24 This
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rule encapsulates two issues. First, to determine federal-question jurisdiction, a court can
only look to the plaintiff’s complaint, not to counterclaims or other claims by
defendants.25 And second, the court can only look at the well-pleaded part of the
plaintiff’s complaint. The well-pleaded part includes only that part that is necessary to
maintain a viable cause of action.26 It includes neither defenses the plaintiff anticipates
nor the plaintiff’s responses to those anticipated defenses.27
The leading case is Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley,28 which
involved a breach-of-contract claim brought in federal court. The Mottleys were injured
on a railroad. They then settled their negligence claims with the railroad and obtained
lifetime passes on the railroad in exchange for their release. The railroad stopped
honoring the passes when Congress enacted a federal statute prohibiting certain freetransportation contracts.29 The Mottleys sued the railroad in federal court, seeking
specific performance of the free-passes contract.30 In their complaint, the Mottleys
argued that the federal statute did not apply to their contract, and, alternatively, that if the
statute did apply, it was unconstitutional.31 Although the Mottleys’ allegations showed
that, “very likely, in the course of litigation, a question under the Constitution would
arise, they [did] not show that the suit, that is, the plaintiff’s original cause of action,
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Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830-31 (2002).
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Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 841 (1989); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S.
58, 63 (1987); see Christopher A. Cotropia, Counterclaims, the Well-Pleaded Complaint, and Federal
Jurisdiction, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 7 (Fall 2004).
28
211 U.S. 149 (1908).
29
Id. at 150-51.
30
Id. at 150.
31
Id. at 151.
26

8

arises under the Constitution.”32 Although the suit would likely require the Court to
construe a federal statute and determine its constitutionality, those questions arose outside
the well-pleaded complaint.33 The questions appeared in the plaintiff’s complaint, but not
in the well-pleaded part.34 Rather, those questions appeared only as anticipated defenses
or responses to anticipated defenses.35
The well-pleaded-complaint rule survives still, often eliminating federal
jurisdiction in cases where the principal—or indeed only—contested question involves
federal law.36 For example, the well-pleaded-complaint rule prevents removal based
upon the preclusive effect of a federal judgment37 or a federal preemption defense.38 Nor
is federal jurisdiction properly based on the presence of a counterclaim created by federal
law, even a compulsory one.39 The Court has also extended the well-pleaded-complaint
rule to the declaratory-judgment context. 40
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717 (1986); Richard E. Levy, Comment, Federal Preemption, Removal, and the Well-Pleaded Complaint
Rule, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 634, 638 (1984) (“the well-pleaded complaint rule withdraws from original
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Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 477 (1998).
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Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1 (1983). One
exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule is the complete-preemption doctrine. As recently
reformulated, the complete-preemption doctrine allows a defendant to remove a case when the plaintiff
asserts a state-law claim that falls within the scope of an exclusively federal cause of action. Such a claim,
we have learned, is really federal. See Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 9 (2003). Justice
Scalia’s dissent aptly notes the oddity of this “federalize-and-remove” exception to the well-pleadedcomplaint rule. Id. at 18 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 833-34 (2002). Although
Vornado was a case interpreting the congressional grant of patent jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338, the
analysis applies equally to § 1331. As the Court noted, "[i]t would take an unprecedented feat of
interpretive necromancy to say that §1338(a)'s 'arising under' language means one thing (the well-pleadedcomplaint rule) in its own right, but something quite different (respondent's complaint-or-counterclaim
rule) when referred to by §1295(a)(1)." Id. at 834. See also Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating
Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
40
Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 10; Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
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As noted above, Grable doesn’t alter the well-pleaded-complaint rule. The rule
still tells us where to look to find the federal issues. Grable impacts the next step, what
kind of federal issues in that well-pleaded complaint give rise to federal-question
jurisdiction.
B. What to look for: the two branches.
Two distinct branches exist under § 1331. The first branch is common,
uncontroversial, and easily applied. The second branch has created problems since its
inception. Unsurprisingly, Grable is a second-branch case.
The so-called Holmes test covers the first branch, the easy federal-question cases.
It states that when federal law creates the cause of action that the plaintiff asserts, the
case “arises under” federal law.41 So if the plaintiff sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or
Section 4 of the Clayton Act,42 jurisdiction is proper under § 1331 because federal law
created the cause of action. Similarly, a claim “arises under” federal law when federal
common law creates the cause of action.43
Justice Holmes intended his test as one of exclusion. In his view, a suit arises
only “under the law that creates the cause of action.”44 The test is as easily applied as it is
stated. If state law creates a plaintiff’s cause of action, the case arises only under state
law, regardless of the presence of federal issues. And since § 1331 only grants
jurisdiction in cases that arise under federal law, a state-law-created cause of action could
never trigger § 1331 jurisdiction.45 The Holmes Test has survived—but only as a test of
41

American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 261 (1916).
15 U.S.C. § 15.
43
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) (We see no reason not to give ‘laws’ its natural
meaning, and therefore conclude that § 1331 jurisdiction will support claims founded upon federal common
law as well as those of a statutory origin.”) (internal citations omitted).
44
Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 214-215 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
45
See id.
42
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inclusion. When federal law creates the plaintiff’s cause of action, the case still “arises
under” federal law.46 Those are branch-one cases.
Branch two was born when the Court rejected the Holmes test as one of
exclusion. In Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., Smith filed a shareholder derivative
suit under Missouri law in federal district court against a corporation.47 Missouri law
created a derivative cause of action that allowed shareholders to enjoin corporations from
purchasing unlawful bonds.48 Smith sought to enjoin the corporation from purchasing
bonds authorized by the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916.49 He alleged that those bonds
were unlawful because the Federal Farm Loan Act was unconstitutional.50 The Act’s
unconstitutionality was the only theory he offered to support his claim, and indeed was
the only issue disputed in the case.51 Thus, while Missouri state law created Smith’s
cause of action, his well-pleaded complaint necessarily raised a question of federal law as
an element of that state-law claim. The Court rejected the Holmes test as one of
exclusion and held that the case arose under federal law. And thus, the second branch
was born. The Holmes test still works as a test of inclusion—when federal law creates
the plaintiff’s cause of action, the case arises under federal law. But state law created
Smith’s cause of action, and yet the suit arose under federal law because there were
federal issues embedded in the state-law cause of action.

46

Some have mentioned a possible narrow exception where even a claim created by federal law will not
satisfy § 1331. See Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 507 (1900). The case has no modern
progeny, and Professor Oakley has recently concluded that Shoshone did not actually involve a federally
created cause of action at all. Oakley, supra n.26 at ___, n.63.
47
25 U.S. 180 (1921).
48
Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 125 S.Ct. 2363, 2367 (2005) (construing
Smith).
49
Smith, 25 U.S. at 195.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 199.
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So what types of federal issues embedded in state-law claims make a case arise
under federal law? Smith confirmed that there is a second branch, but failed to define its
boundaries. In the years that followed, no precise definition appeared.52 Essentially, the
answer became a pragmatic one based on a certain amount of judicial intuition—the
presence of a federal issue in a state-law claim made the case arise under federal law
when the federal court should be empowered to hear it.53 Justice Cardozo wrote that
“What is needed is something of that common-sense accommodation of judgment to
kaleidoscopic situations which characterizes the law in its treatment of causation . . . a
selective process which picks the substantial out of the web and lays the other ones
aside.” 54 Cardozo’s statement teaches that the federal issue must be “substantial,” a
requirement that remains today after Grable.
In 1983, in Franchise Tax Board, the Court summarized both branches:
“Under our interpretations, Congress has given the lower federal courts
jurisdiction [under § 1331] to hear . . . only those cases in which a well-pleaded
complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the
plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on the resolution of a substantial
question of federal law.”55
Franchise Tax Board seemed to unequivocally reaffirm the existence of the second
branch. Although applying its test still required a kaleidoscope (and perhaps a secret
decoder ring), Franchise Tax Board taught that an embedded federal issue in a state-law
52

See Paul Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157 (1953);
William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise “Directly” Under Federal Law,
115 U. PA. L. REV. 890 (1967); Linda R. Hirshman, Whose Law Is It, Anyway? A Reconsideration of
Federal Question Jurisdiction over Cases of Mixed State and Federal Law, 60 IND. L.J. 17 (1985); David L.
Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985).
53
See Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3562 at 47 (“Rather than attempting a test it
might be wiser simply to recognize that the existing doctrines as to when a case raises a federal question are
neither analytical nor entirely logical, and that in the unusual case in which there is a debatable issue about
federal question jurisdiction, pragmatic considerations must be taken into account.”).
54
Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1936).
55
Franchise Tax Board of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S 1, 27-28
(1983).
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claim sufficed for federal-question jurisdiction when the federal issue was “necessary”
and “substantial.”
Three years later, the Merrell Dow case56 cast serious doubt upon the existence of
the second branch, and much ink was spilt by contemporary courts and commentators
debating just what Merrell Dow did to the scope of federal subject-matter jurisdiction.57
While Grable recently clarified what Merrell Dow “really” meant, a complete postGrable synthesis of the law requires an understanding of that debate.
The Merrell Dow facts were not complex. The plaintiffs were mothers who had
taken the drug Bendectin during pregnancy and whose children later developed birth
defects.58 In their state-court petition, plaintiffs alleged six causes of action: negligence,
gross negligence, fraud, breach of warranty, strict liability, and negligence per se.59 The
first five causes of action relied entirely on state law, but the sixth contained a secondbranch, embedded-federal-issue problem. Negligence per se is, of course, a state-lawcreated cause of action. But that claim involved a federal issue because, as their sole
basis for proving negligence per se, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants misbranded
the drug in violation of the Federal Drug and Cosmetic Act (the Drug Act).60 Citing §
1331 and relying on the Franchise Tax Board decision, the defendants removed the case,
alleging that a federal issue (construction of the Drug Act), was both necessary and

56

Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
E.g., Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal
Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and the “Martian Chronicles”, 78 VA. L. REV. 1769 (1992); William V.
Luneberg, Nonoriginalist Interpretation—A Comment on Federal Question Jurisdiction and Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 757 (1987); Note, Mr. Smith Goes to Federal Court: Federal Question
Jurisdiction over State Law Claims Post-Merrell Dow, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2272 (2002).
58
Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 805.
59
Id.
60
Id.
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substantial. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the issue was necessary but not
substantial.
When the Sixth Circuit examined whether Merrell Dow could remove based upon
the presence of an embedded federal issue, it held that there was no “necessary” federal
question.61 In the above-quoted Franchise Tax Board language, the Court had stated that
the plaintiff’s right to relief must necessarily depend upon the resolution of a question of
federal law. Five of the plaintiffs’ six causes of action involved no issue of federal law.
So, the Sixth Circuit held, the plaintiffs’ right to relief did not necessarily depend upon
the Drug Act’s construction because they could recover under five different causes of
action without even referencing federal law.
The Supreme Court held that this case didn’t fail at the “necessary” stage.62
Instead of looking at the plaintiffs’ right to recover in the aggregate, the Court held that
necessity is determined on a claim-by-claim basis.63 The “necessary” box was checked
because the negligence per se claim necessarily depended upon a question of federal law,
even though the plaintiffs asserted other claims. The Court held that, if the negligence
per se claim presented a “sufficient federal question, its relationship to other state-law
claims would be determined by the ordinary principles of [supplemental jurisdiction.]”64
Part V-A will explore the necessity prong in more detail.65
Although there was a necessary federal issue, the Court held there was no federalquestion jurisdiction because the federal issue was not “substantial.” The Court noted
that the Drug Act did not expressly create a private cause of action, and both parties
61

Id. at 806-7 (construing the Sixth Circuit’s decision).
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. at 817, n.15 (1986).
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Part V-A, infra p.
62
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conceded that the Drug Act did not contain an implied cause of action.66 The Court held,
over a vigorous dissent, that a “congressional determination that there should be no
federal remedy for the violation of this federal statute is tantamount to a congressional
conclusion that the presence of a claimed violation of the statute as an element of a state
cause of action is insufficiently ‘substantial’ to confer federal-question jurisdiction.”67
The Court continued:
The significance of the necessary assumption that there is no federal private cause
of action thus cannot be overstated. For the ultimate import of such a conclusion,
as we have repeatedly emphasized, is that it would flout congressional intent to
provide a federal remedy for the violation of the federal statute. We think it
would similarly flout, or at least undermine, congressional intent to conclude that
federal courts might nevertheless exercise federal-question jurisdiction and
provide remedies for violations of that federal statute solely because of the
violation of the federal statute is said to be [actionable] under state law, rather
than a federal action under federal law.68
Many contemporary courts and commentators read this opinion as nearly
eliminating the second branch.69 In his treatise, after Merrell Dow, Professor
Chemerinsky altered the Franchise Tax Board test to state: “A case arises under federal
law if it is apparent from the face of the plaintiff’s complaint either that the plaintiff’s
cause of action was created by federal law; or, if the plaintiff’s cause of action is based on
state law, a federal law that creates a cause of action is an essential component of the
plaintiff’s claim.”70
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Merrell Dow’s meaning was the subject of much guessing.71 Should it be read to
implicitly overrule Smith, where jurisdiction existed even though the Federal Farm Loan
Act did not create a private cause of action? In Merrell Dow, the Court cited Smith, but
didn’t tell us it was overruled.72 And yet, the Court stated that exercising jurisdiction
over a second-branch case would “flout, or at least undermine” congressional intent when
the embedded federal statute did not create a private cause of action.73 Indeed, the Court
conspicuously noted that this was the “first case” in which it had reviewed a secondbranch case since it had reformulated its implied-cause-of-action test.74 This conspicuous
note seemed to signal that the law was indeed changing. And the lower courts were left
without significant guidance, resulting in divergent views over how much of branch two
was left after the Merrell Dow massacre.75
Several circuits subsequently held that the second branch only covered cases
where federal law provided a parallel private cause of action.76 For example, suppose a
state consumer-protection statute provides for treble damages and provides that violations
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of other specified “tie-in” statutes (both state and federal) are also deemed violations of
the consumer-protection statute. Even if one of the tie-in statutes is federal, and even if
that federal statute creates its own cause of action, a plaintiff seeking treble damages may
choose to assert that violation under the state statute. To avoid flouting (or at least
undermining) congressional intent, some circuits viewed the second branch as only
encompassing similar circumstances.
Other circuits refused to read Merrell Dow so restrictively. In those circuits, a
federal issue could still be “substantial” without Congress specifically providing for a
federal remedy.77 Those cases, however, are difficult to reconcile with Merrell Dow’s
warning against flouting congressional intent. Some even suggested that branch two only
covered embedded constitutional claims because in those situations, there was no
analogous congressional intent to flout.78
Even if read to its utmost, the Merrell Dow edition of the “arising under”
definition did not eliminate the second branch entirely. But just how much of branch two
was left? That was the question Merrell Dow left open and the question answered
differently by judges and scholars for the twenty years following Merrell Dow. Finally,
in Grable, the Supreme Court answered, teaching that Merrell Dow was actually decided
under a previously unarticulated prong to the “arising under” definition.
77
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IV. Grable’s modified definition.
Grable was a second-branch case involving an embedded federal tax issue within
a state quiet-title claim. 79 To satisfy a tax delinquency, the IRS seized some of Grable’s
real property.80 The IRS sold the property to Darue and gave Darue a quitclaim deed.81
Five years later, Grable brought a quiet-title action against Darue in state court.82 While
Grable conceded that it had received actual notice of the sale, Grable claimed that
Darue’s record title was invalid because the IRS had not strictly complied with the
applicable notice provisions,83 which Grable contended required personal service. Darue
removed the case to federal court, arguing that Grable’s quiet-title claim, while created
by state law, contained an embedded federal issue (the construction of the federal tax
statute’s notice provision).84
The Supreme Court began by reaffirming the second branch’s vitality. The Court
noted that the federal-question statute is “invoked by and large by plaintiffs pleading a
cause of action created by federal law.”85 But, the Court continued, there is “another
longstanding, if less frequently encountered, variety of federal ‘arising under’
jurisdiction, this Court having recognized for nearly 100 years that in certain cases
federal-question jurisdiction will lie over state-law claims that implicate significant
federal issues.”86 The Court categorized Smith as the “classic example” of a secondbranch case and proceeded to reaffirm the second branch’s existence.87 But Merrell

79

Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 125 S.Ct. 2363 (2005).
Id. at 2366.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
26 U.S.C. § 6335.
84
Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 125 S.Ct. 2363, 2366 (2005).
85
Id.
86
Id. at 2366-67.
87
Id. at 2367.
80

18

Dow, which had sparked so much debate, loomed in the background. The Grable
opinion synthesized the second-branch cases, settled the debate over Merrell Dow, and
provided a new definition for second-branch cases: Jurisdiction is proper in a secondbranch case when a “state-law claim necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually
disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any
congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.”88
The new definition quoted above consists of four prongs: (1) necessity; (2)
actually disputed; (3) substantiality; and (4) disruptiveness. The first three existed before
Grable and the fourth represents the Court’s view of what Merrell Dow really meant.
Below, I will detail how the Court applied the test to find jurisdiction proper in Grable.
Then, in Part V, I will evaluate the four prongs in the post-Grable world.
The Court easily concluded that Grable’s claim passed the necessity and actually
disputed prongs. Grable’s claim necessarily raised the federal tax issue because the state
law required Grable to specify the facts establishing the superiority of its title, and the
only basis Grable had to claim a superior title was the IRS’s failure to give personal
notice of the property’s sale.89 And the federal issue was actually disputed; indeed, the
Court noted, the meaning of the tax statute appeared to be the only legal or factual issue
contested in the case.90 While Grable did not implicate any difficult issues involving the
first two prongs, Part V explores them in more depth.91
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The Court also concluded that the federal tax issue was substantial. The tax issue
was an “important issue of federal law that…belong[ed] in federal court.”92 The Court
noted that the government has a strong interest in prompt and efficient tax collection and
that the “ability of the IRS to satisfy its claims from the property of delinquents requires
clear terms of notice to allow buyers like Darue to satisfy themselves that the Service has
touched the bases necessary for good title.”93 Thus, the Court held, the government had
“a direct interest in the availability of a federal forum to vindicate its own administrative
action, and buyers may find it valuable to come before judges used to federal tax
matters.” 94
Finally, the Court turned to the fourth prong, disruptiveness. As noted above, the
disruptiveness prong is the new part of the test, and it represents the Court’s view of what
Merrell Dow really meant. Recall Merrell Dow, where the Court found no federalquestion jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ negligence per se claim, which contained the
embedded Drug Act issue. The Merrell Dow Court (we thought) resolved the case at the
substantiality prong because the Drug Act did not create its own private right of action:
“[A] congressional determination that there should be no federal remedy for the violation
of [a] federal statute is tantamount to a congressional conclusion that the presence of a
claimed violation of a federal statute as an element of a state cause of action is
insufficiently ‘substantial’ to confer federal-question jurisdiction.”95 But Grable teaches
that Merrell Dow is not really a substantiality case at all. In Grable, the Court noted that
the absence of a private right of action under the Drug Act affected the Merrell Dow
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result in two ways. First, it was worth “some” consideration in the assessment of
substantiality. But its “primary importance,” we now know, is found in the
disruptiveness prong.96
We now know, from Grable, that the Merrell Dow Court saw the missing Drug
Act right of action “not as a missing federal door key, always required, but as a missing
welcome mat, required in the circumstances when exercising federal jurisdiction” would
disrupt the congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial
responsibilities.97 Because finding jurisdiction over the negligence per se claim would
have “attracted a horde of original filings and removal cases raising other state claims
with embedded federal issues,” a welcome mat was required.98
No welcome mat was required in Grable because allowing jurisdiction over the
quiet-title claim would not be disruptive, as it would have been in Merrell Dow.
Although Congress “indicated ambivalence by providing no private right of action to
Grable, it is the rare state quiet title action that involves contested issues of federal law.
Consequently, jurisdiction over actions like Grable’s would not materially affect, or
threaten to affect, the normal currents of litigation.”99
Thus, the Court concluded that jurisdiction was proper under the second branch
because Grable’s state-law claim necessarily raised a federal tax issue, which was
actually disputed and substantial. And in what is Grable’s addition to the “arising
under” dictionary, allowing jurisdiction over quiet-title claims with embedded tax issues
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is not disruptive enough to require a welcome mat. The next Part analyzes the four
prongs in greater depth.

V. Applying the new definition.
As noted above, second-branch cases now involve a four-prong jurisdictional
inquiry. When a state-law claim contains an embedded federal issue, the federal issue
must be: (1) necessary; (2) actually disputed; (3) substantial; and (4) accompanied by a
welcome mat, if exercising jurisdiction would be disruptive.
A. Necessity.
A state-law claim “must necessarily raise a stated federal issue.”100 The necessity
prong requires a distinction between claims and theories. Again, recall Merrell Dow.
There, the Supreme Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s holding that the embedded Drug
Act issue was not “necessary.”101 In Franchise Tax Board, the Court had stated that the
plaintiff’s right to relief must necessarily depend upon federal law.102 The Sixth Circuit
applied that language to the Merrell Dow plaintiffs and concluded that because the
plaintiffs could have recovered on five separate claims that involved no issues of federal
law, the plaintiffs’ right to relief did not necessarily depend upon federal law. The
Supreme Court rejected this narrow view of necessity and concluded that federal law
need only form a necessary element of one of the plaintiff’s claims. Whether jurisdiction
is proper over the remaining claims is determined by principles of supplemental
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jurisdiction.103 Because the plaintiffs’ negligence per se claim necessarily depended on
the Drug Act, the necessary prong was satisfied.
But let’s change the Merrell Dow facts slightly. Suppose the plaintiffs had
asserted two theories to support their negligence per se claims, one alleging the violation
of the Drug Act and another alleging the violation of a state statute. Then, would federal
law form a necessary element of that claim? The answer is probably not, though
distinguishing claims from theories is not always clear.
The claims-versus-theories distinction originated in Christianson v. Colt
Industries Operating Corp.104 Although Christianson was decided in a different context,
many courts have applied its reasoning in § 1331 cases. The issue in Christianson was
whether the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction over an appeal. The Federal Circuit has
jurisdiction over appeals from final district-court decisions when the district court had
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338.105 Section 1338 provides that “the district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress
relating to patents.”106 The Court noted that both § 1338 and § 1331 contained the terms
“arising under” and held that linguistic consistency demanded that the terms be construed
similarly.107 Thus, the Court evaluated whether the plaintiffs’ claims necessarily raised
an issue of patent law.
The plaintiffs had asserted two antitrust claims under the Sherman Act: a
monopolization claim under § 2 and a group-boycott claim under § 1.108 The plaintiffs
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had alleged alternative theories to support each claim. But not all of the theories involved
the patent laws.109 The Court noted that federal jurisdiction focuses on claims, not
theories.110 A claim arises under the patent laws only if a question involving the patent
laws is necessary to that claim. Accordingly, a “claim supported by alternative theories
in the complaint may not form the basis for §1338(a) jurisdiction unless patent law is
essential to each of those theories.”111 Ultimately, the Court held that because the
plaintiffs’ claims were each supported by alternative theories unrelated to the patent laws,
the patent laws were not necessary to the claims, and the case did not arise under the
patent laws.112
Because of the Court’s focus upon linguistic consistency with the term “arising
under,” it is unsurprising lower courts have extended this test to the necessity prong of
the second-branch federal-question test. For example, in Willy v. Coastal Corp., the
plaintiff asserted a state-law wrongful-discharge claim.113 The plaintiff alleged that he
was fired because he refused to violate various state and federal environmental and
securities laws.114 The Court characterized the plaintiff’s claim (wrongful discharge) as
relying upon at least two alternative theories: first, that the plaintiff was fired for refusing
to violate federal law; and second, that he was fired for refusing to violate state laws.
Relying on Christianson, the Fifth Circuit concluded that jurisdiction was improper under
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the second branch because federal law was not a necessary element of the state-law
claim.115
But distinguishing claims from theories is not always easy. For example, in
Merrell Dow, the Court held that the Drug Act was a necessary element of the plaintiff’s
negligence per se claim. The plaintiff had also asserted a vanilla negligence claim, but
the Court treated negligence per se and negligence as different claims, and thus federal
law only had to be necessary to one of the claims. Had the Court treated negligence as
the claim and negligence per se as one of the theories supporting the claim, the claim
would have failed the necessity test because the plaintiffs’ vanilla negligence claims had
nothing to do with federal law.
While the lines between theories and claims are not entirely clear, several
principles, which can be synthesized from the discussed cases, guide the inquiry. First,
surely whether federal law is necessary should not depend upon how the plaintiff
numbers the counts in the complaint. Suppose a plaintiff sharing the same claims as the
Willy plaintiff wants into federal court. Federal jurisdiction cannot depend upon how that
plaintiff numbers the counts. It should be immaterial whether the plaintiff separately
numbers his wrongful-discharge counts or whether the complaint contains only one
Roman Numeral within which the plaintiff asserts all reasons supporting wrongful
discharge. While many jurisdictional principles depend upon the plaintiff being the
master of the complaint, which issues qualify for second-branch treatment should not
depend on the complaint’s organization. The second-branch inquiry is designed to select
claims that, while created by state law, deserve a federal forum. The necessity prong is
one step in that inquiry, and allowing the plaintiff to manipulate the outcome by mere
115
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numbering would be inconsistent with a process that is supposed to involve selection of
worthy federal issues through a “common-sense accommodation of judgment to
kaleidoscopic situations.”116
The second principle that guides the necessity inquiry is: When a plaintiff asserts
different ways in which a defendant violated a particular section of a statute, the
allegations under that section form a single claim, and the ways in which the defendant is
alleged to have violated that section are theories, all of which must depend upon federal
law to satisfy the necessary prong. For example, in Christianson, though the plaintiff
alleged different ways in which the defendant violated the group-boycott provision of § 1
the Sherman Act, the court treated those allegations as involving a single group-boycott
claim supported by alternative theories.117 Similarly, in Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., the
Fourth Circuit rejected jurisdiction.118 There, the plaintiff asserted a violation of a South
Carolina statute that made it “unlawful for a person to discharge a citizen from
employment or occupation because of political opinions or the exercise of political rights
and privileges guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States or by the
Constitution and laws of South Carolina.”119 The plaintiff, who had been fired for
bringing a toolbox to work with a Confederate battle-flag decal, asserted that his firing
violated the law in three ways: it violated the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution, South Carolina public policy, and the South Carolina Constitution.120
Although the plaintiff asserted these theories in “separate counts” of his complaint, the
Court correctly treated the statutory wrongful-discharge claim as a single claim and
116
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rejected jurisdiction because federal law was not essential to all of the theories supporting
that claim.121
Third, a plaintiff who asserts violations of different statutory sections, even within
the same statute, asserts multiple claims, only one of which must necessarily depend
upon federal law. Again looking to Christianson, the plaintiff alleged violations of two
sections of the Sherman Act.122 The Court construed the complaint as stating two
claims—one based on each section—not merely one Sherman Act claim. To satisfy the
necessity prong, resolving the question of federal law must be necessary to all the
theories supporting one claim.123
While distinguishing between common-law claims and theories can potentially be
more difficult, most cases are not. For example, other courts have followed Willy and
determined that wrongful discharge is a single claim, and reasons why the discharge was
wrongful are theories, all of which must depend upon federal law to satisfy the necessity
prong.124 Similarly, if a plaintiff invokes multiple statutes as establishing a duty for
negligence per se, those different statutes provide different theories, and if even one is a
state statute, federal law cannot be a necessary element of the negligence per se claim.
Additionally, Merrell Dow provides a basis for analogy when the plaintiff asserts closely
related grounds of recovery. Recall that, there, the Court construed negligence and
negligence per se as different claims, only one of which had to necessarily depend upon
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federal law.125 A more questionable distinction appears in a recent case where the
plaintiff sued a cable company for breach of contract. 126 In that case, the contract
obligated the cable company to disclose and charge rates “subject to applicable law.”
The plaintiff asserted that the cable company breached the contract because it violated a
federal statute and a state statute. The Court held that the plaintiff’s complaint contained
two separate breach-of-contract claims, even though both relied upon the same contract
and indeed the same provision.127
In summary, the necessity prong is determined on a claim-by-claim basis. Federal
law must be a necessary element of a state law claim. So long as that test is satisfied,
jurisdiction over remaining claims will be determined by principles of supplemental
jurisdiction.128 But federal law will not be a necessary element of a state-law claim when
that state-law claim is supported by alternative theories, unless each of those alternative
theories requires resolution of a federal issue.
B. Actually disputed.
In a second-branch case, “the federal issue in a state-law claim must actually be in
dispute to justify federal-question jurisdiction.”129 In Grable, the parties actually
disputed the tax issue, and indeed it “appear[ed] to be the only legal or factual issue
contested in [the] case.”130 Thus, the actually disputed prong was satisfied. The Court
distinguished an older quiet-title case because, in the older case, the federal statutes on
which title depended were not subject to any controversy respecting their validity,
125
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construction, or effect.131 While the following paragraphs explore this prong in some
detail, I will ultimately conclude that the requirement that a federal issue be “actually
disputed” is probably best left to the substantiality prong.
The Court’s treatment and articulation of this prong raises a timing anomaly.
Federal-question jurisdiction is usually determined from the face of the plaintiff’s
complaint. How can we determine what issues are actually disputed from the plaintiff’s
complaint? In Grable, because the case was removed, the Court knew the issue was
disputed because it could compare the plaintiff’s complaint with the notice of removal.
But what if the plaintiff had filed the case originally in federal court? Would the Court
look to the answer or a motion to dismiss? Suppose plaintiffs file a second-branch case
in federal court, and suppose a federal issue appears on the face of the well-pleaded
complaint. When does the court determine whether the federal issue is actually disputed?
Does the inquiry end with the answer? What if the defendant’s answer disputes the
federal issue, but after discovery progresses, the defendants clarify that they no longer
dispute the federal issue, but still dispute other issues in the case? Subject-matter
jurisdiction can, after all, be raised at any time. Does the fact that the federal issue is no
longer disputed divest the court of jurisdiction?
Unless refined, this prong seems to be in tension with the well-pleaded-complaint
rule.132 The well-pleaded-complaint rule has its critics,133 but it has survived largely
because it avoids the type of timing questions raised in the preceding paragraph.
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well-pleaded-complaint rule often operates to remove from federal jurisdiction even cases
that turn entirely on federal law, when the federal issue arises only by way of defense or
counterclaim.134 It has survived (rightly or wrongly) because of the efficiency that results
from being able to determine jurisdiction from the outset. If I were writing on a clean
slate, I might suggest that federal-question jurisdiction should indeed depend on which
federal issues are actually disputed. But a candid synthesis of what the law is must
account for the ever-looming well-pleaded-complaint rule.
Given the survival of the well-pleaded-complaint rule, it is difficult to conclude
that the Court meant, in this narrow context, to direct lower courts to look beyond the
plaintiff’s complaint. If a court must wait for an answer to determine whether the issue is
actually disputed, it is hard to see why a court cannot also look to the answer to find
substantial, disputed federal defenses. True, such a distinction would retain some notion
of the plaintiff being “master of his complaint.” But the master-of-the-complaint mantra,
alone, is not so much of a justification as it is a tidy restatement of the result of being able
to determine jurisdiction from only the plaintiff’s pleadings. Once federal-questionjurisdiction inquiries proceed to the defendant’s answer, it is difficult to justify—under
what’s left of the well-pleaded-complaint rule—declining jurisdiction when an answer
reveals a substantial federal defense or counterclaim.135
The Supreme Court’s treatment of this prong suggests no calculated departure
from the well-pleaded-complaint rule. Indeed, perhaps the Court means that the federal
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issue raised by the plaintiff must be actually (and reasonably) disputable. This rephrasing
seems more consistent with the Court’s treatment of the older quiet-title case where the
Court rejected jurisdiction because the “federal statutes on which title depended were not
subject to any controversy respecting their validity, construction, or effect.”136 If the
federal issue is settled or the answer to the federal question clear, the presence of a settled
issue in a state-law cause of action should not trigger federal adjudication.
Ultimately, this prong is unlikely to create many problems. While I have
discussed its possible implications, its impact on second-branch cases will probably be
negligible. The prong appeared because the Grable Court had to distinguish some older
quiet-title cases. The “actually disputed” language will likely be repeated in headnote
form, but should not be extended to intrude upon the well-pleaded complaint rule because
its concerns about federal issues being “not subject to any controversy” are adequately
addressed by the substantiality prong, discussed below. If a federal issue is not subject to
any controversy, it simply is not substantial.
C. Substantial.
The federal issue embedded in the state-law claim must be “substantial.” No
precise definition of substantiality is available, and the precedents in this area are
reconcilable only because the Court has made the “test sufficiently vague and general
[such that] any set of results can be reconciled” with a post hoc analysis.137
Substantiality depends upon the nature and importance of the embedded federal
issue.138 This broad statement about “nature and importance” can be further broken
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down. Is there a special need for federal expertise in this matter?139 Is there a special
need for uniformity?140 Will the issue’s resolution reach beyond the instant dispute into
areas of particular federal concern?141 Along with the nature and importance of the
federal issue on a national scale, some have suggested that courts should consider how
prominent the federal issue is in the particular lawsuit, or in other words how “central”
the federal issue is to the dispute between the parties.142 This centrality concern seems
better suited for the necessity prong, and indeed considering it within the substantiality
prong seems to conflict with Merrell-Dow. The necessity prong covers how prominent
the federal issue must be in a lawsuit. If the federal issue is necessary to one claim, the
impact of other claims is determined under the supplemental-jurisdiction statute,143
including its provisions for declining supplemental jurisdiction when state claims
predominate.144
Ultimately, the generalizations are just that, general.145 And Justice Brennan
seemed to be correct in arguing that the precedents in this area are reconcilable only
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because the standards are general enough to mold to any desired post hoc
reconciliation.146 This, of course, leaves much room for advocacy.
The Grable case raises the most compelling of the substantiality concerns. There,
resolving the federal tax issue would reach well beyond the parties and impact an area of
unique federal concern, IRS tax sales. As one court stated, resolving the federal issue
would “directly affect the functioning of the federal government.”147 In Grable, the
Supreme Court noted, the “meaning of the federal tax provision is an important issue of
federal law that sensibly belongs in federal court. The Government has a strong interest
in the prompt and certain collection of delinquent taxes, and the ability of the IRS to
satisfy its claims from the property of delinquents requires clear terms of notice to allow
buyers like Darue to satisfy themselves that the Service has touched the bases necessary
for good title.”148 While stare decisis will, of course, cause any ruling to reach beyond
the parties, and while presumably all federal laws are important, the Grable case involved
the government’s interest “in the availability of a federal forum to vindicate its own
administrative action.”149 Grable also implicated the other two concerns: the need for
uniformity and federal expertise. State courts infrequently address federal tax statutes,
and the need for uniformity was important for the reasons noted above.
It seems unlikely that the Court will find jurisdiction proper when a federal issue
is embedded in a garden-variety state tort claim or when the parties incorporate a federal
law into a private contract. Before Grable, most courts would have held that such a claim
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would not contain a “substantial” federal issue. But after Grable clarified that Merrell
Dow was not a substantiality case, how the federal issue is incorporated is probably best
left to the “disruptiveness” prong. The substantiality prong focuses upon the nature and
importance of the federal issue. How that issue is embedded or incorporated does not
impact the need for uniformity or federal expertise—it impacts whether a welcome mat is
needed.150 Phrased differently (and perhaps too candidly), the substantiality prong
appears to represent whether the court thinks this issue deserves federal resolution. The
disruptiveness prong accounts for the structural reality that Congress, not the Court, has
the final say in what issues deserve federal resolution.151
D. Disruptiveness.
A court cannot exercise second-branch jurisdiction if doing so would disrupt the
congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.152 The
disruptiveness prong is a potential veto, grounded in the principle that Congress controls
federal jurisdiction. Even when a federal issue is necessary, actually disputed, and
substantial, jurisdiction is improper if exercising it would be disruptive.153 Exercising
jurisdiction is disruptive if Congress provided no “welcome mat” when one is needed.
Not all cases require a welcome mat.
First, as a preliminary matter, a welcome mat will rarely exist in a second-branch
case. A welcome mat exists when a plaintiff asserts a state-law claim that incorporates a
federal law, and when Congress provided a federal private right of action for violations of
the federal law. A welcome mat is rare in second-branch cases because, ordinarily, when
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a case involves a federal statute that creates a cause of action, the plaintiff will have sued
under that statute. That is, most cases involving cause-of-action-creating federal statutes
are first-branch cases.154 But if a welcome mat is present in a second-branch case, the
disruptiveness inquiry ends, and jurisdiction is proper as long as the other three prongs
are met.
But a welcome mat is not always needed. The presence of a federal right of
action for the embedded federal law is not a “missing federal door key, always required,”
but rather is only a welcome mat, needed when exercising jurisdiction over a class of
cases would materially disrupt the flow of litigation between state and federal courts.155
Contrasting Grable and Merrell Dow provides the starting place for determining when
this welcome mat is needed.
In Merrell Dow (as construed by Grable), jurisdiction was absent because hearing
the case without a welcome mat would have been disruptive. There, the plaintiffs
incorporated the Drug Act standard into their negligence per se claim. The Drug Act did
not create a private right of action—it contained no welcome mat.156 A welcome mat was
required because allowing garden-variety tort claims into federal court when they
incorporated federal law would have “heralded a potentially enormous shift of
traditionally state cases into federal court.”157 As the Court noted, “One only needed to
consider the treatment of federal violations generally in garden variety state tort law. The
violation of federal statutes and regulations is commonly given negligence per se effect in
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state proceedings.”158 When allowing a type of embedded issue into federal court would
attract a “horde of original filings and removal cases,” federal courts need the
congressional welcome mat—even if they view the issue as substantial enough to warrant
federal adjudication.
By contrast, in Grable, federal-question jurisdiction was proper despite the
absence of a welcome mat because only the “rare state quiet title action . . . involves
contested issues of federal law.”159 Exercising “jurisdiction over actions like Grable’s
would not materially affect, or threaten to affect the normal currents of litigation.”160
The disruptiveness prong is based mostly on concerns about separation of powers.
Congress is responsible for defining the federal courts’ jurisdiction. Deciding whether
jurisdiction is proper is supposed to be an exercise in statutory construction. But until
Merrell Dow, jurisdiction depended largely upon judicial views of the proper allocation
of jurisdiction. Merrell Dow introduced the novel concept of congressional intent into
the jurisdictional inquiry, but its reasoning was unpersuasive. Grable found a middle
ground, requiring express congressional approval before significantly altering the federal
docket, but allowing jurisdiction in those rare cases where the phrase “arising under” can
fairly reflect implicit congressional approval based on the impossibility of Congress
laying welcome mats for the myriad, unforeseeable ways in which federal issues may
arise.
Given the sensitive concerns outlined above, Grable’s proceed-without-awelcome-mat holding should not be read too broadly. Congress can foresee cases
involving garden-variety tort claims with embedded federal issues and provide the
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welcome mats where appropriate.161 Thus, exercising jurisdiction in cases like
negligence per se, breach of fiduciary duty, malpractice, and wrongful discharge would
be disruptive, and cannot genuinely be distinguished from Merrell Dow.162 It would be
similarly disruptive to allow private parties to incorporate federal standards into their
contracts and create jurisdiction where Congress has not.163 And importantly, the Court
clarified that disruptiveness is a veto, separate from concerns about substantiality. The
separation-of-powers concerns underlying the disruptiveness prong cannot be alleviated
by a court’s view about the importance of the federal issue. Grable teaches that’s a
separate inquiry.
VI. Conclusion.
Grable’s new edition confirms that the second branch lives. Its four-prong test,
while surely not providing a bright line, creates a workable structure when the steps are
kept conceptually distinct. The first prong—necessity—and the well-pleaded-complaint
rule govern the placement of the federal issue in the case and how prominent the federal
issue must be in relation to the lawsuit. The second prong—actually disputed—is more
conceptually troubling and is properly treated under the substantiality prong. The third
prong—substantiality—still allows for judicial consideration of the need for federal
adjudication, considering the nature and importance of the federal issue. And the fourth
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prong—disruptiveness—is a possible veto, grounded in the notion that Congress, not the
courts, controls federal jurisdiction. This latter prong requires restraint. It is separate
from the substantiality determination and requires judicial deference to Congress’s
judgment about the proper allocation of the federal judicial power.
Unless the second branch is entirely eliminated,164 complete clarity in this area is
unobtainable. If adhered to faithfully, Grable will result in few second-branch cases
properly within § 1331. Whether that result is desirable can (and surely will) be debated.
But the Grable edition admirably answers more questions than it creates and provides a
reasonable structure for the inquiry. This clarity is a welcome change to the post-Merrell
Dow world.
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